The concept of dividend in transferable utility games was introduced by Harsanyi [1959]. It offers a unifying framework for studying various valuation concepts, from the Shapley value (symmetric as well as weighted) to the different notions of values introduced by Weber [1988]. Using the decomposition of the characteristic function used by Shapley [1953] to prove uniqueness of his value, the idea of Harsanyi was to associate to each coalition a dividend to be distributed among its members to define an allocation. Many authors have contributed to that question. Here, we offer a synthesis of their work, with a particular attention to restrictions on dividend distributions, starting with the seminal contributions of Vasil'ev [1978] , Hammer, Peled and Sorensen [1977] and Derks, Haller and Peters [2000] , until the recent paper of van den Brink, van der Laan and Vasil'ev [2014].
Introduction
We begin with a chronological enumeration of the concepts that will be formally defined and interrelated in the present paper.
The notion of game with transferable utility, defined by a set of players and a characteristic function, was introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944. The characteristic function associates to each subset (coalition) of players a real number measuring what that coalition can do at best in terms of some commodity-money.
The concept of value of a transferable utility game was introduced by Shapley in 1953 . His initial idea was to define what a player may reasonably expect from playing a game.
However, by requiring players' evaluations to be consistent in order to achieve efficiency (an exact distribution of the social output) and symmetry (equal treatment of equals), the Shapley value is more of a normative tool.
The concept of dividend was introduced by Harsanyi in 1959 . His idea is to associate to each coalition a dividend (positive or negative) that can be distributed among its members to define an allocation of the social surplus. The dividends are identified with the coefficients of the decomposition of the characteristic function used by Shapley to prove uniqueness of his value. The set of allocations that results from all possible distributions of the dividends is an object that has been studied in the 70's independently by Vasil'ev in papers published in Russian, and by Hammer, Peled and Sorensen in a paper published in a Belgian operations research journal. While the latter used the name "selectope", here we shall retain the term "Harsanyi set". Derks, Haller and Peters popularized that concept in a paper published in International Journal of Game Theory in 2000. At that time, they were not aware of the contributions of Vasil'ev. These became known with the publication in 2002 by Vasil'ev and van der Laan of a paper containing all the results known by that time. Since then, a number of papers have been published, in particular by Vasil'ev [2006, 2010] .
In 1971, Shapley has characterized geometrically the core of a convex game using the concept of marginal contribution vector that associates allocations to players' orderings: for a given ordering, each player receives his marginal contribution, following the ordering. He shows that the core of a convex game is the non-empty and bounded polyhedral convex set whose vertices are precisely these marginal contribution vectors.
In 1988, Weber has introduced the notion of probabilistic values that allocates to each player his expected marginal contribution computed with respect to a probability distribution independent of the game's data. Quasi-values are probabilistic values obtained by considering probability distributions ensuring efficiency and the Shapley value is the unique efficient and symmetric quasi-value. Weber also defines the concept of random order value as the expected marginal contribution vector, computed with respect to a given probability distribution over players' orderings. He shows that random order values are quasi-value, the Shapley value 4 being the random order value corresponding to the uniform probability distribution.
Moreover, he shows that the core is a subset of the set of random order values, equivalently defined as the convex hull of the marginal contribution vectors. This set is known as the Weber set and, following Shapley's characterization of the core, the two sets coincide on the class of convex games, and only for these games as shown by Ichiishi [1981] .
In his doctoral thesis, Shapley [1953a] did also consider the possibility for symmetric players to be treated differently. The asymmetric version of the value is obtained by introducing exogenous weights in order to cover asymmetries that are not included in the underlying game. The weighted Shapley value has been axiomatized later, in particular by Kalai and Samet [1987] without explicit reference to weights, by Hart and Mas-Colell [1989] using a generalized potential function and by Dehez [2011] in a cost sharing context along the lines suggested by Shapley [1981] . The value associated to positive weights is obtained as a weighted division of dividends. As a consequence, weighted values are Harsanyi payoffs.
Alternatively, it can be defined as the expected marginal contribution vector corresponding to a probability distribution over players' orderings derived from weights. The Shapley set is the set of all weighted values obtained by considering all possible weight systems, including zero weights. Monderer, Samet and Shapley [1992] show the Shapley set contains the core, an inclusion "somewhat surprising in light of the difference in concept behind these solutions" to quote the authors. Weighted values being random order values, the Shapley set is contained in the Weber set and the three solution sets coincide when applied to convex games.
The Harsanyi set turns out to be the largest solution set. It includes the Weber set. Hammer et al. [1977] and Vasil'ev [1981] show that the Harsanyi set and the core coincide if and only if they apply to almost positive games -games whose dividends of multiplayer coalitions are non-negative. Consequently, positive games being convex, the four solution sets -core, Shapley, Weber and Harsanyi sets -coincide when applied to almost positive games.
All these solutions have been characterized axiomatically. They can also be characterized starting with the Harsanyi set and imposing restrictions on dividend distributions. A natural restriction is monotonicity. It requires that the share of a player in the dividend of a coalition does not increase if the coalition is enlarged. Even if such restrictions reduce considerably the set of possible dividend distributions, it is not sufficient to generate a particular solution set. Billot and Thisse [2005] claim that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors resulting from monotonic dividend distributions coincides with the core if (and only if) the game is convex.
We show that this is actually true only for 3-player games! Assuming a monotonic dividend distribution, individual rationality obtains in 3-player superadditive games and in 4-player convex games. Beyond four players, we show that there is no hope. Under a stronger monotonicity condition, Vasil'ev [1988] shows that Harsanyi payoff vectors are random order values. Under the assumption that the distributions of dividends within coalitions are 5 compatible with Bayesian updating, Derks et al. [2000] show that the resulting Harsanyi subset coincides with the Shapley set.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces transferable utility games. Solution concepts are then defined and interrelated in Section 3, with a particular attention to weighted Shapley values and the case where some players are assigned a zero weight. In Section 4, we review the axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley, Weber and Harsanyi sets. We then look at the characterization of the Weber and Shapley sets by way of restrictions on dividend distributions. We finally consider the subsets of Harsanyi payoffs that result from graph structures on the set of players. The last section offers concluding remarks and an appendix gathers intermediary results.
Transferable Utility Games

Characteristic functions
Cooperative games cover situations in which a group of individuals cooperate on a common project with the objective of maximizing the resulting collective gain. It is assumed that utility is transferable through some commodity-money, allowing for transfers (side-payments) between players. A cooperative game with transferable utility is defined by a player set N and a characteristic function v that associates to each coalition S  N a real number () vS that represents its (potential) worth defined as the gain that it can realize without the participation of the others. In particular, () vi is what player i could obtain alone and the value of the game () vN is the maximum amount that the "grand coalition" is able to generate. By convention, we set ( ) 0. v  Notation: Set inclusion is denoted by  and strict inclusion by . For sa given subset S, \ Si denotes the subset obtained by subtracting i from S. Upper-case letters are used to denote sets and the corresponding lower-case letters to denote their sizes:
s S t T 
Coalitions {i,j,k,…} are sometimes written as ijk… For any given set T, we denote by
  the collection of non-empty subsets of T and by In some instances, the summation sign  will be used without reference to a set when there is no ambiguity. For a given finite set A, we denote by () A  the set of all probability distributions on A. 
Superadditivity and monotonicity
A game ( , ) Nv is superadditive if getting together is beneficial, or at least harmless:
It implies that the largest surplus is generated by the grand coalition. There is no direct relation between superadditivity and monotonicity except for the following lemma. A game ( , ) Nv is 0-monotonic if its 0-normalization
Nv is a monotonic game. As a consequence of Lemma 1, the 0-normalization of a superadditive game is a monotonic and positive-valued game and thereby, superadditive games are 0-monotonic.
0-monotonicity implies that the inequalities
S is said to be essential if the inequality is strict. If equality holds, S is said to be inessential. Obviously, for 0-monotonic games, if a coalition is inessential, so are all its subcoalitions. A game is said to be essential if the grand coalition is essential and a game whose coalitions are all inessential is an additive game.
Superadditivity is a natural assumption that is satisfied in most economic and social situations. It ensures that allocating exactly the value of a game among the players if efficient:
no partition of players can form and generate a total gain larger than the value of the game. This is not ensured by 0-monotonicity for games with more than 3 players.
Harsanyi dividends
We denote by () GN the set of all set functions on the finite set N . It is a vector space that is formally equivalent to 21 . 
.
1 Proofs of lemmas are in Appendix.
Following Harsanyi [1959 Harsanyi [ , 1963 , T  is interpreted as the dividend accruing to coalition T. By (1), () vN is the sum of the dividends of all coalitions. Hence, an allocation of () vN can be obtained by distributing the dividends of every coalition among its members.
2 Dividends can be defined recursively, starting with 0,    as follows:
i.e.
Alternatively, the collection of 's T  is the unique solution of the linear system (1):
Additivity of the dividends follows from (2):
Two games ( , ) and ( Nv of an arbitrary game ( , ) Nv are unchanged except for singletons: Remark 3. Positive games are monotonic. This can easily be seen from (1).
Marginal contributions
The marginal contribution of player i to coalition S is defined by ( ) ( \ 
Two players i and j are symmetric in a game ( , ) Nv if they contribute equally to all coalitions to which they belong: ( ) ( \ ) ( ) ( \ ) for all such that , .
Player i is necessary for player j in a game ( , ) Nv if the marginal contributions of j are zero in all coalition not containing i :
vj Using (2), van den Brink et al. [2014] prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. If player i is necessary for player j in a game ( , ),
Nv
Remark 4. A player is null if and only if the dividends associated to coalitions containing
that player are all equal to zero. This is an immediate consequence of (2). See also Lemma 2. 
Here, the following identities prevail:
( 1,..., )
Convex games
Obviously, convexity implies superadditivity and a game that is strategically equivalent to a convex game is itself convex. It is easily verified that unanimity games are convex. As a consequence, positive games are convex as positive linear combinations of convex games, and almost positive games are convex as well by strategic equivalence.
Shapley [1971] shows that a game is convex if and only if players' marginal contributions do not decrease with coalition size:
Hence convexity means increasing returns to size and marginal contributions are maximal at the grand coalition N.
For any given player set N, the set of superadditive games, the set of monotonic games, the set of 0-monotonic games and the set of convex games are convex cones,
MG0(N)
and CG(N) respectively. They are indeed closed under addition and positive scalar multiplication. 4 The set of positive games is a convex cone as well. It is denoted by ( ). GN  Following Remark 3, we have the following sequences of inclusions:
An arbitrary game ( , )
Nv can be decomposed in a difference between two positive (and thereby convex) games. Indeed (1) can be written as
The dividends associated to these two games are given by:
Convex games form an interesting class of games because solution concepts tend to agree when applied to convex games. 5 Moreover, many interesting economic situations can be modeled as convex games, like production games with increasing returns, bankruptcy games (Aumann and Maschler [1985] ) and airport games (Littlechild and Owen [1973] ). Positive games are convex and monotonic games with interesting properties and applications, like 4 A nonempty set X is a convex cone if and only if , and 0 . Maschler et al. [1972] . river games (Ambec and Sprumont [2002] ), queuing games (Maniquet [2003] ) and liability games (Dehez and Ferey [2013] ).
Values and Solution Sets
Basic properties
Given a game ( , ) , Nv the problem is to allocate () vN between the n players. Given a player set N, a value is a mapping that associates a payoff vector ( , ) n Nv   to any game ( , ) . Nv A solution set is a mapping  that associates a subset ( , ) Nv  of payoff vectors to any game ( , ) . Nv Basic properties that a solution set should ideally possess are the following:
Non-emptiness implies restrictions on the class of games on which the solution applies. As such, efficiency is an accounting identity. It does not necessarily imply full efficiency except for superadditive games. Indeed, there may exist a partition 1 ( ,..., )
Individually rationality is a minimal requirement to be imposed on allocations: no player will ever accept to take part in a collective project if his remuneration falls short of what he could secure by himself. A solution is covariant if, once it has been applied to a game, it can be extended to all strategically equivalent games. Convexity is a natural requirement in a world where utility is transferable. Corresponding properties apply to values. Ideally, a value should be covariant and define an efficient and individually rational allocation.
Imputations
Imputations are efficient and individually rational allocations. This defines the imputation set:
The class of games ( , )
Nv satisfying the inequality
is the largest class of games on which the imputation set is a well-defined solution. It includes 0-monotonic games.
If the game is essential, ( , ) I N v it is a regular simplex of dimension n-1. If instead the game is inessential, ( , ) I N v is reduced to the singleton ( (1),..., ( )). v v n The imputation set is the largest solution set satisfying the above requirements.
Remark 5. For 0-monotonic games, marginal contributions as defined by (5) are imputations. Indeed, for a given players' ordering, adding the n! vectors results in () vN and, according to (4), marginal contributions are bounded below by individual worth's. Efficiency and individual rationality then follow.
Stable allocations: the core
The core is the set of imputations that no coalition can improve upon:
The core extends rationality from individuals to coalitions: given an allocation, a coalition that receives less than what it could secure for itself is in a position to object. In this sense, core allocations are "stable".
6
The core is a polytope i.e. a bounded polyhedral convex set. It is indeed bounded and results from the intersection of finitely many closed half spaces. It is a subset of the imputation set and it may be empty. The largest class of games on which the core is a well-defined solution is the class of balanced games. 7 Superadditivity is neither necessary nor sufficient for a game to have a non-empty core. However, for games with a non-empty core, no partition of the grand coalition can do better. Core allocations are therefore are fully efficient.
Remark 6. It can be easily verified that, if i and j are symmetric players, allocation obtained by exchanging and ij xx in a core allocation x are also core allocations. Hence, if non-empty, the core contains allocations that give to players i and j equal amounts. Furthermore, the core allocates zero to null players.
Shapley [1971] shows that convex games are balanced and that the core of a convex game is the polytope whose vertices are the marginal contribution vectors as defined by (5). Ichiishi [1981] shows that this is actually a necessary and sufficient condition for convexity. q S N S    as a probability distribution over coalitions that may be objective, as the result of some random mechanism, or subjective. The probabilistic value associated a probability matrix N qQ  is then defined for each player as his expected marginal contribution:
Quasi-values and random order values: the Weber set
A probabilistic value does not necessarily define an efficient payoff vector because probability distributions are unrelated. Quasi-values instead are efficient probabilistic value obtained from probability distributions matrices N qQ  satisfying \ 1 and for all ( ), .
Weber [1988] indeed proves that the probabilistic values defined in (9) 
Random order values are average marginal contribution vectors computed with respect to some probability distribution on players' orderings.
For a given game ( , ) , Nv the random order value associated to the probability distribution
The following proposition establishing the equivalence between quasi-values and random order values was proved by Weber [1988] . The Shapley value is a particular quasi-value. Weber [1988] proves that it is the unique symmetric quasi-value. It is defined by probabilities that depend only on coalitions' sizes:
These probabilities correspond to the following two-step random mechanism: 11 first, a coalition size between 1 and n is picked up at random and then each player receives his marginal contribution to a coalition picked up at random among the coalitions of the predetermined size of which he is a member. All sizes have the same probability, namely 1/n, and the probability of picking up a coalition of size s containing a given player is given by
As a random order value, the Shapley value corresponds to uniformly drawn random orders i.e. ( ) 1/ ! pn   for all :
The Shapley value is the average marginal contribution vector and can then be seen as resulting from another two-step random mechanism: first, players are ordered randomly and they then receive their marginal contribution, depending on their position in the order that has been picked up. To show that (13) and (14) distribution matrices in the case of n players. For a given game ( , ) , Nv the Harsanyi payoff vector ( , , ) h N v  derived from a distribution matrix
is given by the inner product ( , , ) ( , ) :
( ) ( , ) ( 1,..., ).
15
It is an allocation:
We call ( , , ) h 
, ( ) . v v n The Harsanyi set associated to the unanimity game ( , )
N Nu is the unit simplex: ( , ) .
Nn
H N u  For a given subset T, the dividend T  is allocated between the members of T and, depending on its sign, players in T receive a positive or a negative amount. Hence, the Harsanyi set can alternatively be written as:
It is obviously a non-empty and convex set. It is covariant. Indeed, if ( ) ( ) ( ) v S a v S b S
   for some 0 a  and , n b  we have:
( , ), ...
i.e. the additive term affects only the coefficient associated to singletons. Therefore, we have:
( , , ) ( 1,..., ). 
Hence, ( , , ) h N v  is the marginal contribution vector associated to the ordering .   Hence, following Remark 5, the Harsanyi imputation set defined by:
HI N v H N v I N v
 is a solution set that satisfies the five basic properties when applied to 0-monotonic games. 
Weighted Shapley values
The Shapley value relies on symmetry: equal amounts are allocated to symmetric players. Shapley [1953b] derives (13) We denote by ( , , ) SV N v w the weighted Shapley value associated to the game ( , , ) .
N v w It is the Harsanyi payoff vector associated to the dividends' distribution derived from w: Weighted Shapley values ( , , ) SV N v w can alternatively be obtained as random order values ( , , ) w RV N v p where w p is a probability distribution on players' orderings depending on w.
For an arbitrary players' ordering , the marginal contributions of player i in the unanimity Let's assume for a moment that weights are positive and natural numbers, i w being interpreted as the number of players of type i. We then compute the probability that a given ordering comes out through a sequence of () wN independent drawings, knowing that each time a player is drawn, he is removed and only the last player of a given type to be removed is placed in the ordering. The number of possible sequences is given by ( )! ! i w N w  and they all have the same probability of occurrence. To illustrate the process, let's take n = 3 and w = (1,2,3) . Then, ( ) 6 wN  and there are 60 drawing sequences. For instance, the sequence (3,2,3,3,1,2) leads to the ordering (3,1,2) where player 2 comes last.
Player j comes out last in a given ordering if and only if he is the last to be drawn. This occurs with probability
The probability that player k comes next to last knowing that player j came last is given by: 
the game that concerns the subset of non-zero weight players, once () vZ has been distributed to zero weight players. The following proposition establishes that, in order to compute weighted values, positive-weight players and zero weight players can be treated separately. 
where 0 p is an arbitrary probability distribution on Z .  The corresponding allocation is then given by: ( , )( , ) ( ( , ), ( \ , )).
We omit the dependence of Z on w.
20
Hence, for a player , iZ  we have:
Hence, the probability distribution 0 p being arbitrary, we can conclude that ( , ) . 
Z Zv
18
The Shapley set is clearly a non-empty subset of the Weber set and, as a solution, it is covariant. It is however not a convex set in general, as was observed by Monderer, Samet and Shapley [1992] , except for the 2-player games or for convex games, as we shall see later.
Remark 9. Owen [1968] has been the first to notice that weighted values are not necessarily monotonic with respect to weights: an increase in the weight assigned to a player may indeed result in a decrease of his payoff. Weights being interpreted as measures of players' relative importance (Shapley talks about bargaining abilities), this is an embarrassing fact. It is however no surprise in view of (18), knowing that dividends may be negative.
19 Monotonicity clearly holds for almost positive games. Monderer et al. [1992] have shown that it actually holds for (and only for) convex games. This can be explained intuitively by the link that exists between a characteristic of convex games and the probability distribution over orderings induced by the weights. Increasing the weight of a player means increasing his probability of arriving late and we know that marginal contributions are increasing with coalition size in convex games. Hence, increasing the weight of a player naturally increases his expected payoff.
Relation between solutions
The question is now to see how the core, the Weber set, the Shapley set and the Harsanyi set are interrelated.
Proposition 4. The following sequence of inclusions holds for 0-monotonic games:
When applied to convex games, the first three solutions coincide.
Proof. Weber [1988] has shown that the core is a subset of the Weber set and that, when applied to convex games, the two solutions coincide. Actually this coincidence is a necessary and sufficient condition for convexity. We have already seen that weighted values are random order values. 20 Monderer, Samet and Shapley [1992] have shown that the core is a subset of the set of weighted values. By Proposition 2, random order values are convex combinations of
Harsanyi imputation vectors. Hence, the Weber set is a subset of the Harsanyi set. The sequence of inclusions then follows from the convexity of the Harsanyi set.  Proposition 5. All solutions coincide on the set of almost positive games: ) . C N v WS N v W N v HI N v 
This is a corollary of the following proposition due to Hammer et al. [1977] and Vasil'ev [1978] .
Proposition 6. The core and the Harsanyi set coincide on the set of almost positive games.
Proof. Let ( , )
Nv be an almost positive (and thereby convex) game. Looking at its 0-normalization, we have: 
and 0 for all .
ui  and {} ( ) 0 for all . i u j j i  The core is additive on the class of convex games. This follows from the following two lemmas:
Lemma 3. The core is a superadditive solution (Peleg [1986] ).
Lemma 4. The Weber set is a subadditive solution (Dragan, Potters and Tijs [1989] ). 20 In fact, the Shapley set is in general a dimensionally small subset of the Weber set.
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Hence, we have:
where the right-hand side is the Harsanyi set of the game 0 ( , ). Nv  Actually, Hammer et al. [1977] and Vasil'ev [1981] prove that the core and the Harsanyi set coincide only if they apply to almost positive games. Knowing that core allocations (if any)
are H-payoff vectors, another way to prove Proposition 6 consists in showing that the reverse
holds for almost positive games. Indeed, using (15), we have:
At this stage, we can conclude that the core, the Shapley set, the Weber set and the Harsanyi imputation set all satisfy the five basic properties when applied to convex games. In particular, the Shapley set is a convex set in this case.
By Proposition 6, ( , ) ( , ) and ( , ) ( , ).
[2000] proves that ( , ) 
Characterizing Solutions
There are different ways to characterize values and solutions. We will consider two ways: by axioms and by restrictions on dividend distributions.
Characterization by axioms
Given a player set N, consider the following properties applying to a value : ( ) :
These are usual properties. The following proposition is due to Vasil'ev [1982 Vasil'ev [ , 2006 . 21 We give here a simple proof.
Proposition 7. For any given player set N, a value  satisfies efficiency, weak positivity, null player and additivity if and only if  is a Harsanyi value.
Proof. H-payoffs vectors are efficient and the H-payoff of a null player is obviously zero.
Weak positivity follows from the definition of H-payoffs (15). Additivity follows from dividends' additivity.
Consider the unanimity game ( , )
T Nu  where TN  and .
  Because unanimity games are positive and players outside T are null players, an application  satisfying efficiency, weak positivity and null player must be such that: we have:
As a consequence, ( , ) Nv  is a H-payoff vector of the game ( , ) : Nv
. 'ev [1981] provides an axiomatization of the Harsanyi set that requires convexity and a restricted notion of additivity applying to disjoint games.
23
21 Vasil'ev also requires homogeneity although only additivity is actually needed. 22 The author is grateful to a referee for pointing out the non-additivity of the Harsanyi set. 23 See also Vasil'ev and van der Laan [2002] .
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Weber [1988] proved that strengthening the positivity axiom results in the Weber set.
Proposition 8. For any given player set N, a value  satisfies efficiency, strong positivity, null player and additivity if and only if  is a random order value.
To obtain weighted Shapley values, a specific axiom is needed. Derks et al. [2000] use the following axiom:
Proposition 9. For any given player set N, a value  satisfies efficiency, consistency, null player and additivity if and only if  is a weighted Shapley value.
It is easy to check that consistency is satisfied by the weighted value when associated to positive weights. Indeed, we have: .
It means that if a player leaves a coalition, that should not reduce the share of those remaining in the coalition. This monotonicity property imposes strong restrictions on distribution matrices. In particular, if the share of a player in a coalition is zero, his share must be equally zero for all larger coalitions.
We denote by ( , ) m H N v the subset of Harsanyi payoffs vectors derived from monotonic distribution matrices. The following proposition is due to Derks et al. [2000] . 
1.
The H-payoff of player i is therefore given by ( , , ) 0
Nv being positive valued and monotonic, ( , , ) h N v  cannot be a random order value. 
We therefore have the following inclusion: ( , ) ( 1) 0 for all and . ( 1) for all and ,
for all and , (34)). This game is superadditive but not convex. The distribution matrix given in Table 2 Beyond four players, convexity does not ensure individual rationality under monotonicity. Table 3 26 We only reproduce the shares of player 1. Shares can easily be allocated to the other players so as to satisfy monotonicity. 
